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ACTION. See Ferry.
Covenant for Benefit of a third Person zot party to it.-Although a
deed is inter partes, a covenant therein made with a third person may be
enforced by such third person by suit, if it clearly appears by the instru-
ment that it was the intention to confer such right: National Union
Bank v. Segur. 10 Vroom.
The mere presence, in such deed, of a covenant with a third person,
will not, as has been held by many cases, be evincive, by its own tree,
of such intention: Id.
ADMIRALTY.
Salvage-Distrbution-Assgnment of Shares of Salvage-money pre-
viously earned.-A cause of distribution of salvage was instituted on
behalf of some of the ei'ew of a steamship against the owners of the
steamship. The owners of the steamship appeared to defend the suit,
and in their statement of defence alleged in effect that, subsequently to
the salvage services, but before any amount had been paid in respect
of such services, fourteen of the plaintiffs bad by deed, in consideration
of sums varying from l. to 10s., paid them by the defendants, assigned
to the defendants all their respective shares of salvage reward. The plain-
tiffs demurred to the paragraphs of the statement of defence containing
these allegations. The court sustained the demurrer on the ground
that the assignment was void under the Act of 17 & 18 Vict., c. 102:
The Rosario, Law Rep. 2 P. Div.
Semble. The assignment would be void even without the statute, as
inequitable : Id.
Collision- Damage- (ollision. between Vessel moored and T'essel driven
from her moorings by third Vessel-DDuty of Vessel lying at moorings
during a gale to haae chains bent and look.out on deck.-During a very
violent gale, a brig adrift in the Tyne drove down on a steamer which
was lying properly moored to mooring buoys placed there by the harbor
authorities. On the brig striking the steamer the ring of one of the
buoys was carried away, and the steamer got adrift, and drove down the
1 Prepared expressly for the American Law Register, from the original opinions
filed during Oct. Term 1876. The cases will probably be reported in 4 or 5 Otto.
2 Selected from late numbers of the Law Reports.
3 From Hoyt Post, Esq., Reporter ; cases decided at January Term 1877 ; the
volume in which they will be reported cannot yet be indicated.
4 From G. D. W. Vroom, Esq., Reporter; to appear in vol. 10 of his Reports.
5 From E. L. De Witt, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 29 Ohio State Reports.
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river, and ultimately came in contact with and did damage to a barque,
wlioe owners instituted a cause of damage against the steamer in the
county court of Northumberland, to recover for the damage done to their
vessel by the steamer. At the hearing it was proved that the chain
cables of tile steamer had been unbent at the time she got adrift, and
that no look-out had previously been kept on" deck, though it was known
that the weather was getting worse. -Held, on appeal, affirming the
decision of the court below, that the defence of inevitable accident, set
up by the owners of the steamer, was not sustained, and that the steamer
was alone to blame for the collision : The Pladda, Law Rep. 2 P. Div.
ARBITRATION.
Award-Bill to correct- TUdidity of Award-Res adjudicata.-Ma-
comber and Beam were partners, and having agreed to arbitrate their
partnership difficulties, deposited notes for 81200 each with the arbitra-
tors, who on their award being made, were to deliver to the one who
should be found creditor of the other the note of the latter endorsed
down to the amount of the balance awarded. The award was in Ma-
comber's fivor, and Beam's note was delivered to him. Afterwards
Beam brought suit in chancery to have the award corrected on the
ground of mistake, and he was allowed a credit, to be deducted from the
note, for an item which by accident and mistake was not brought to the
attention of the arbitrators. (See Beam v. Macomber, 33 Mich.) The
action in this case was brought on said promissory note. On the trial,
Beam sought to show that the award was not valid, and it was held that
the decree in the chancery suit precluded him from this defence. He
relied on the ground that no point was made in the chancery suit up.on
the validity of the award, and that, in the absence of such an issue, it
remained undisposed of and open to litigation at law. field, that the
bill was based on the alleged existence of a valid award, and was incon-
sistent with anything else ; that, if no valid award existed, there was a
perfect defence at law, because the note in such case was not delivered
as a binding obligation, and was not in the hands of a bona fide holder;
that the whole controversy in the chancery cause turned on the assump-
tion that nothing remained open except the item overlooked on the ar-
bitration ; that a party cannot get relief on one basis and then seek a
new chance to litigate on the suggestion that he has a defence which he
did not see fit to rely on before; and that the ruling of the court below,
that Beam was concluded by the decree, was correct: Beam v. _Aacorn-
ber, S. 0. Mich., Jan. Term 1877.
BILLS AND NOTES.
.Aegotiable character of-Presumption as to.-Transferees of a nego-
tiable instrument, such as a bill of exchange or promissory note payable
subsequent to its date, hold the instrument clothed with the presump-
tion that it was negotiated for value in the usual course of business at
the time of its execution, and without notice of any equities between
the prior parties to the instrument: Collins v. Gilbert et al., S. C. U. S.,
Oct. Term 1876.
Possession of such an instrument payable to bearer or endorsed in
blank is prim'a facie evidence that the holder is the proper owner and
lawful possessor of the same, and nothing short of fraud, not even gross
ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS.
negligence, if unattended with malafides, is sufficient to overcome tne
effect of that evidence or to invalidate the title of the holder supported
by that presumption: N.
Clothed as the instrument is with those presumptions, the plaintiff is
not bound to introduce any evidence to show that he gave value for the
same until the other party has clearly proved that the consideration of
the instrument was illegal or that it was fraudulent in its inception, or
that it had been lost or stolen before it came to the possession of tile
holder: Id.
In the absence of' evidence to the contrary, the presumption is that an
endorsement was made at the date of the instrument or at Teast ante-
cedently to its becoming due : Id.
Signing without reading-EstopeL-A person possessed of the ordi-
nary faculties and ability to read, signed and delivered a negotiable pro-
missory note without knowing it to be such, but without reading the
same, having an opportunity to do so, relying solely on the representation
of the payee that the paper was an instrument other than a note. held,
as against a bona fide holder before maturity for value, such maker will
not be permitted to deny the due execution of the note: 1riuchell v.
Crider, 29 Ohio St.
Signing with Blanks-Negligene.-In an action against the maker
by a bon! fide endorsee, before due and for value, of a negotiable pro-'
missory note, the defendant is liable if guilty of negligence in the execu-
tion thereof, although he did not intend to sign a note, and was induced
through fraudulent representations as to its character, to believe that the
instrument executed was one of a different purport: Ross v. Doland, 29
Ohio St.
A person who negligently signs and delivers to another a printed form
of a negotiable promissory note containing blanks, without knowing it
to be such, is estopped as against a subsequent bonat fide holder for value
and before due, from denying authority in the person to whom it was
delivered to fill the blanks : 'Id.
CHARTERPARTY. See Skipping.
COLLISION. See Admiralty.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.
Act of State laying Dity on Tonnage void.-In 1862, the legislature
of New York passed an act defining and regulating the powers, duties
and compensation of the captain and harbor-masters of the port of New
York; amended April 17th 1865. The 0th sect. declared: "The
following fees shall be collected under this act and no others. All ships
or vessels of the United States of one hundred tons burthen or more,
except lighters, tugs, barges and canal boats, sound and river steamboats
employed on regular lines, and all ships or vessels that are permitted by
the laws of the United States to enter on the same terms as vessels of
the United States, which slall enter the port of New York, or load or
unload, or make fast to any wharf therein, shall pay one and one half
of one cent per ton, to be computed from the tonnage expressed in the
registers of enrolinents of such ships or vessels respectively; and all
other foreign ships which shall arrive at and enter the same port, and
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load or unload, or make fast to any wharf therein, shall pay three cents
per ton, to be computed ou the tonnage expressed in the registers or
documents on board." I ld, that the state, in passing this law ininpos-
ing a tonnage duty exercised a power expressly prohibited to it by the
Constitution of the United States, and that in that particular the law
was therefore void : Inman Steamship Co. v. Tinker, S. C. U. S., Oct.
Term 1876.
Emient Domain-Railroads-Lands once apliro)riated to Public
itses-Second al1 rolrtion.-While railroads, in one sense, are for
the use and accommodation of the public, and to this extent may be
considered as used for public purposes, it is fallacious to assume there-
from that the property by them acquired, having been taken for a public
purpose, may be used and appropriated by any other corporation for a
similar purpose, without making compensation therefor, or that property
public fbr one purpose shall be public for all; the public may have
the right to use property that is appropriated for certain purposes, and
yet individuals or private corporations have rights therein at the same
time, and these separate private rights are entitled to protection, and can
only be divested when held by a corporation, in the same manner and
under the same laws as individual rights may be : The Grand Ral)ids,
Iewaygo & Lake Shore Railroad Co. v. The Grand Rapids and ILzdi-
ana Railroad Co., S. 0. Mich., Jan. Term 1877.
The franchises or property of one railroad may be taken for the con-
struction of another in all cases where the property of an individual
might be upon making compensation therefor: Id.
Judicial Power-Limitation of Jurisdiction of Supreme 6ourt.-
When an inferior tribunal fails to pursue the provisions of a legislative
grant and to keep within it, the right of this court to review the erro-
neous proceedings attaches, and it is beyond the power of the lawmaker
to arrest the employment of the appropriate writ for that purpose. A
legislative act prohibiting a writ of certiorari in such case is unconsti-
tutional and void : Tralhagen v. Township of West loboken, 10 Vroom.
A reasonable time may be limited within which the writ in such case
shall be sued out: .1d.
Qumere. Whether it is within the range of judicial inquiry to deter-
mine what is a reasonable time ? 'd.
Where the provision of the law under which an assessment is made
is unconstitutional, the right of the legislature to limit a time within
which a certiorari shall issue to review it, doubted: Id.
CONTRACT.
Sale of Logs-Agreement to deliver .fotes- Construction.-Moore sued
]oyden & Akely fbr an alleged ihilure to deliver certain notes, which,
as he claimed, they were bound to deliver as part payment for logs fur-
nished them ; and he recovered judgment for $1262.68. The contract
between the parties was made on October 16th 1874, and was in substance
is follows: Moore agreed to sell and deliver to Boyden & Akely, afloat
in Flat river, in time for the main drive in the spring of 1875, all the
merchantable pine logs that could be cut from the timber then standing
on two hundred acres of land described, at the price of $7 per thousand
for all logs cut in a specified lot, and S6 per thousand for the rest. Pay-
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ments in cash were to be made, of $500 on December 1st 1S74 ; $500
on January 15th 1875, and $200 on May 1st 1875. The balance was
to be paid in three equal payments, in two, four and six months from
and after May 1st 1S75. The purchasers were to give their bank notes
for these payments at any time when requested. The logs were to be
scaled by a sealer named. The cash payments were duly made and the
purchasers had paid to Moore $13,595.87 before suit was brought. This
suit was commenced May 18th 1875 The logs for which payment was
demanded bad not all been put afloat before suit brought, but the court
below held this to be unnecessary, and ruled that plaintiff was entitled
to demand pay by notes for all logs cut upon the land, as soon as the
amounts were ascertained. Teld, that this was erroneous; that the price
to be paid for the logs in question was a certain sum per thousand, for
logs delivered afloat in season, for the spring run of 1875 ; that the pur-
chasers were not to be at any risk in the matter, and were not obliged to
receive any other logs; that they were not called upon to give notes
until a balance could be found beyond the $3000 of cash advances, and.
this balance could not be calculated on any logs not set afloat; that
whether scaled in one place or another, the logs sealed could not entitle
Moore to payment, until he had delivered them, and that defendants
were not in default when the suit was brought: Boyden v. Ylfoore, S. C.
Mich. Jan. Term 1877.
CORPORATION. See Waters.
COVENANT.
Running with the Land.-A covenant that confers an immediate,
permanent and beneficial effect on the use to which real estate is designed
to be applied, will run with the title: Nat. Union Bank v. Segur, 10
Vroom.
CRIMINAL LAW.
Chaulenges-M.aanslatghiter-Se f-defence--Where, on the trial of a
-criminal cause, a juror is challenged by the defendant for cause, and the
challenge is improperly refused, but such juror is afterwards excused
on a peremptory challenge, the judgment will not be reversed for such
error, if an acceptable jury be impanelled before the defendant has ex-
hausted his right to peremptory challenges: Erwin v. The State, 29
Ohio St.
Intention or purpose to kill may be present in the crime of man-
slaughter, where the killing is without malice upon a sudden quarrel:
Id.
Where death is caused by the use of a deadly weapon, and the cir-
cumstanqees of the killing arc detailed to the jury, some of which tend
to disprove a malicious or intentional killing, it is misleading to charge
the jury "that in this case the law raises a presumption of malice in the
defendant, and an intent on his part to kill the deceased :" Id.
Where a person in the lawful pursuit of his business, and without
blame, is violently assulted by one who manifestly and maliciously
intends and endeavors to kill him, the person so assaulted, without
retreating, although it be in his power to do so without increasing his
danger, may kill his assailant if necessary to save his own life or pre-
vent enormous bodily harm: JR.
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Lareny-Lost G,)ods.-WhCn a person finds goods that have nctually
been lost, and takes possession with intent to appropriate them to his own
use, really believing at the time, or having good ground to believe, that
the owner can be itound, it is larceny: Baker v. The ,Sltate, 29 Ohio St.
Spiitziatism-l'aliistr.-Tlie appellant was convicted by justices
under 5 Geo. 4, c. 83, s. 4, which makes punishable as a rogue and
vagabond "every person * * * using any subtle craft, means or device
by pa"'istry or otherwise, to deceive and impose on any of his majesty's
subjeets." In a case stated fbr this court, tile justices fbund as a fact
that the appellant attempted to deceive and impose upon certain persons
by falsely pretending to have the supernatural faculty of obtaining from
invisible agents and the spirits of the dead, answers, messages and mani-
festations of power, namely, noises, raps and the winding up of a musical
box: hIeld, that the means used by the appellant came within the words
"by palmistry or otherwise," and that the conviction was right : Monck
v. 1lilton, Law Rep.. 2 Ex. Div.
DAMAGES.
Intention of lPlaintiff in bringing ,S't.-In an action by a passenger
against a railroad company for being wrongfully ejected from the cars
by tle conductor, it appeared that the rates of fare fixed by the com-
pany, and which by its established rules it was made the duty of the
conductor to demand, were higher than those allowed by law. The
plaintiff tendered what he claimed to be, and what was ultimately held
to be the legal rates, and, upon refusal to pay more, was ejected from
the cars, but without any rudeness or unnecessary violence. It also
appeared that the plaintiff, at the time he took passage, knew the estab-
lished rates, and expected to be ejected from the cars, intending to bring
an action for such ejection, in order to test the right of the company to
charge the established rates. Held, that the plaintiff was only entitled
to compensatory damages, and that it was competent for the company,
for the purpose of mitigating damages, or preventing the recovery of
exemplary damages, to give in evidence subsequent declarations of the
plaintiff, tending to prove that his object in taking passage on the cars
was to make money, by bringing suits against the company for demand-
ing or receiving their established rates of fare: C. 11. & D. Railroad
Cbom)any v. Cole, 29 Ohio St.
DEBTOR AND CREDITOR. See Husband and Wife ; Partnership.
DEED.
Jjddence to Identify the Land granted.-Extrinsic testimony is admis-
sible to identify land conveyed by the following description, to wit : "A
tract or lot of land known as the east half of the southwest division of
section 17," although such testimony shows that the land so conveyed
is less in quantity than the mathematical half of the division : Schlief
v. Wart, 29 Ohio St.
EMINENT DOMAIN. See Constitutional Law.
EQUITY PLEADING.
.Effect of Answer-.Afnst le vegativ'ed by mhore than one Tl tness.-The
general rule of equity practice is that when a defendant has by his
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answer under oath expressly negatived the allegations of the bill, and
the testimony of one person only has affirued what has been negatived,
the court will not decree in favor of the complainant. There is then
oath against oath. In such cases there must be two witnesses, or one
with corroborating circum stances, to overbear the defendait's sworn
answer : Seitz et ux. v. MJitchell, S. C. 1. S., Oct. Term 1876.
This rule, however, does not extend to averments in the answer not
directly responsive to the allegations of the bill : Id.
ERRORS AND APPEALS.
From Circuit Court to Sureme Court of United States.-The allow-
ance of an appeal, under section 692, Rev. Stat., follows of course if
prayed for by one who has- the right to it. The language of the statute
is, "shall be allowed," which means '" must be allowed" when asked fbr
by one who stands in such relation to the cause that he can demand it.
The question upon such an application is not what will be gained by an
appeal, but whether the party asking it can appeal at all : Lx Parte
Jordan er ,,., S. C. U. S., Oct. Term 1876.
The Circuit Court can be compelled by writ of mandamus to allow the
appeaJ asked for: Id.
J11andomus.-A writ of mandamus cannot perform the offices of a writ
of error: Exparte Loring, S. C. U. S., Oct. Term 1876.
Jurisdiction.-The Supreme Court of the United States has only such
appellate jurisdiction as has been conferred by Congress, and in the
exercise of such as has been conferred can proceed only in the manner
which the law prescribes : United States v. 11oun, S. C. U. S., Oct.
Term 1876.
In the Supreme Court of the United States a writ of certiorari is
allowed only as auxiliary process to enable the court to obtain further
information in respect to matter. already before it for adjudication : I,.
Appeals in Bnkriptc/.-Appeals do not lie to the Supreme Court
from the decisions of the Circuit Courts in the exercise of their super-
visory jurisdiction under the bankrupt law: Conro et al. v. Crane et al.,
S. C. U. S, Oct. Term 1876.
Vho may aplpeal.-Where a decree is entered directing a receiver
for a railroad company to pay money into court, although not a party to
the foreclosure suit under which the money was realized, he is such a
party in interest as to be entitled to an appeal ; IIhcl v. Railroad
Co., S. C. U. S., Oct. Term 1876.
ESTOPPEL. See Bills and Xotes ; Megotiable Instrument; TVendor;
Waters.
FERRY.
Damnm,, absgue iinuria-Loss of Trajloc-Disturbance by Bridge.-
The owner of a ferry cannot maintain an action for loss of traffic caused
by a new highway by bridge or ferry made to provide fir a new traffic.-
Qiuere, Whether the exclusive right of the owner of a ferry extends
beyond the carriage of passengers by boat ? A railway company, under
the authority of their act, constructed across a river, half a mile above
an ancient ferry, a railway bridge and a foot-bridge, the foot-bridge
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being used by persons going to the railway station and also to other
places. The traffic across th terry fiel off, and the ferry was given up.
The owners of the ferry claimed compensation : hehl, reversing the
decision of' the Queen's Bench Division, that no compensation could be
recovered, on the ground that an action could not have been maintained
for disturbance of the ferry in respect of the traffic either by the rail-
way or by the lbot-bridge, if they had been erected without the author-
ity of an act: Moplckhs v. Great N. Railroad Oo., Law Rep. 2 Q. B.
Div.
FOREIGN JUDGMENT.
Conclusiveness of.-A. judgment rendered in another state, when sued
on here can be impeached only on the ground that the adjudging court
did not have jurisdiction over the person of the defendant or the subject-
matter : Jardine v. Retchart, 10 Vroom.
If the defendant was present in the foreign state when proceedings
were begun and process was served upon him, no irregularity in such
service, unless such as deprived it of all citatory effect, can be set up
against the judgment ensuing thereon, in a suit on such judgment in
this state : Id.
FORMER ADJUDICATION. See Arbitration ; Set-off.
FRAUDS, STATUTE OF. See Waters.
.Mmorandu m-Tle'grla2.-Buck et al., defendants in error, were
allowed to recover damages for McElroy's (plaintiff in error) refusal to
keep his contract to accept and pay for a quantity of hogs he had agreed
to take of them. The original 'undertaking was verbal, and nothing was
ever paid, and there was no delivery. Buck & Williams, defendants in
error, were to procure the hogs, being in value $100, and deliver them
for shipment within two weeks of August 11th 1874, at Sturgis, at 5
cents per pound, and McElroy was to accept and pay at Sturgis, on or
before August 25th. McElroy was to have the right to go to Ohio
before being bound, and in case lie should decide to take the hogs on
the terms specified, was to telegraph Buck & Williams to that effect, and
one Bryant was to act as his agent in the matter. McElroy, on August
15th, telegraphed from Ohio that he would take double-deck car of
hogs, and that Bryant would close the contract. This quantity was the
same specified in the original arrangement. The hogs were duly pro-
vided and held ready for delivery, but McElroy repudiated the arrange-
ment, and refused to accept the hogs, or pay for them. The court below
held the telegram sufficient as a memorandum under the Statute of
Frauds. 11eld, that this ruling was wrong; that standing by itself the
telegram contained none of the elements of a bargain, except the quantity,
and did not purport to be a memorandum of ain agreeuient at all, but
only a simple notification of adhesion to an agreement before provisionally
arranged, and the terms of which were assumned to be understood: Xe-
Elroy v. Buck et al., S. 0. Mich., Jan. Term 1877.
GUARANTY.
Bond-Sureties-Conthuu.q Obliqation - Indefinite Time-- With-
(lraadl of Gnarant3,-Slsequeut Transactions -- This was an action
upon a bond given by plaintiffs in error to defendants in error for the
504
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performance by Jeudevine of an agreement to pay defendants in error
such notes as he should, under such agreement, give them for the pur-
chase price of musical instruments to be sold and delivered by them to
him. The bond was given in November 1874. In December following,
defendants in error sold and delivered to Jeudevine an Estey organ and
took his note, which was paid. Subsequently further sales were made to
Jeudevine. under the arrangement, the sureties on the bond called on
defendants in error and forbade their making further sales to Jeudevine,
and gave notice that they would not be responsible ol account of any
further sales. Further sales were'made, nevertheless, and Jeudevine's
notes taken, which not being paid, this suit was brought on the bond for
the amount thereof. The bond specified no limitation in time for the
duration of the liability of the sureties. Iedl, first, that the courts lean
strohgly to a construction of instruments of suretyship, given to secure
performance of future mercantile engagements without express limitation
as to time, which will confine the liability, in point of time, within rea-
sonable bounds. Held, second, that while as to transactions already had
there could be no withdrawal, and accrued liability could not be cancelled
in that way, yet in the absence of obligation for a continuance of liability
in point or time, there is no good reason for precluding a withdrawal as
against transactions in no way yet entered upon ; that as to transactions
not yet instituted, not as yet in existence, the guaranty was meant to
be at the will of the guarantors ; and that the sureties were not liable
on the bond for the notes given for sales made against their protest, and
after they had notified the obligees of their withdrawal from further
liability : Jeudevine et al. v. Rose et al., S. C. Mich., Jan. Term 1877.
HIGHWAY.
Neednot be from Town to Town.-Tbe ancient rule of the common law,
that it was of the esence of a highway that it should be laid to a market
town, or from town to town, and be a thoroughfare having no terminus
a quo or terminus ad quem, has been overruled. It is now not essential
to a highway that it be a thorough fare. If, in fact, it is open and com-
mon to all the public, it is a public highway, without regard to the place
of its termination : The State v. Bishop et al., 10 Vroom.
A road may be laid out as a public road, under the statute of New
Jersey, though it*have, at one end, no outlet, and termiuate on private
property: Id.
H:OMESTEAD.
Mortgage-Subsequent selection of Premises as Homestad.-A mort-
gage of premises, no part of which constitutes the family homestead of the
mortgage debtor, at the time of the execution and delivery of the mort-
gage, although not executed by the wife, is not affected by the subsequent
selection and occupancy of the premises mortgaged, as the homestead of
the mortgagor: Gibson v. Mundell, 29 Ohio St.
As against such mortgage, the wife of the mortgage debtor is not
entitled to an assignment of a homestead in the premises mortgaged : Id.
HUSBAND AND WIFE.
Property purchased by Wife during Coerture- Y'tle as aqainst Crell-
itors.-In a contest between a wife and her husband's creditors, mere
VOL. XXV.--64
ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS.
evidence that she purchased the property during the coverture is not
sufficient to give her title; it must be satisfactorily shown that the pro-
perty was paid for with her own separate funds ; and in the absence of
such evidence, the presumption is a violent one that the husband fur-
ni.-hed the means of payment: Seitz et ux. v. Mitchell, S. C. U. S. Oct.
Term 1876.
JUDG MENT.
By1 dfault-Assessment of Damages -In an assessment of damages
under judgment interlocutory by defiiu4t, the only matter that the plaintiff
has to prove, or the defendant is permitted to controvert, is the amount
of damages. The cause of action stated in the declaration, and the right
to some damages in respect to it, are admitted by the default - Creamer
v. Dikeman, 10 Vroom.
LANDLORD AND TENANT.
Liei on, Chattels on the demised Premiscs -Landlords leasing real
property in the District of Columbia, have a tacit lien upon such of the
personal chattels of the tenant upon the premises as are subject to exe-
cution for debt, commencing with the tenancy and continuing fbr three
months after the rent is due, and until the termination of any action
for such rent brought within the said three months : Beall et al v.
White et at, S. C. U S., Oct. Term 1876
Statutory liens have without possession the same operation and efficacy
that existed in comnon-law Jiens where the possession was delivered : Id.
Personal chattels on the premises, sold in the ordinary course of trade,
without knowledge of the lien, are not subject to its operation, or, in
other words, the lien in respect to sales, where the goods are removed
from the premises, is displaced, and the purchaser takes a nerfect title
to the property discharged of the lien : Id.
LIBEL.
Privileged Commziniettion-Publieation of matters of Public Interest-
AMeetings of lPoor-law Guardians-Ex parte (7Arges.-The administra-
tion of the poor-laws, both by the government department and by the
local authorities, including the conduct of the medical officers, is a mat-
ter of public interest; but the publication of a report of proceedings at
a meeting of poor-law guardians, at which ex parte charges of miscon-
duct against the medical officer of the Union were made, is not privi-
leged by the occasion: Purcell v. Sowler, Law Rep. 2 C. P. Div.
Slander of Tltle.-The plaintiffs, vocalists, advertised in a theatrical
newspaper, as follows: "The sisters Hartridge have great pleasure in
thanking [certain firms, music publishers,] for their kind unhesitating
permission to sing any niorceaux from their musical publications." The
defendant, who was interested as agent for the proprietors of the "stage
right" of certain songs published by the firms mentioned, wrote to the pro-
prietors of two music halls at which the plaintiffs were engaged to sing,
to the effect that the advertisement, if relied upon in every particular, was
calculated to lead them to incur penalties under the copyright act, inas-
much as the publishers named had in some instances no power to give
the alleged permission, and further, that the firms in question had not
accorded the permission claimed, insinuating that music hall singing
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was not calculated to create a demand for their musical publications.
Plaintiffs claimed that as they had the right to sing the songs they had
advertised, this letter was in the nature of slander of their title, and
by reason of it they had been discharged from certain engagements to
sing. Upon a motion to set aside a nonsuit. Ield, that inasmuch as
the letters were reasonably susceptible of a construction which would
make them libellous, the opinion of the jury ought to have been taken
upon their meaning: Hart v. Wall, Law Rep. 2 C. P. Div.
LIEN. See Landlord and Tenant.
MANDAMUS.
To Inferior Court-Bill of Exceptions -A writ of mandamus will lie
to the judges of an inferior court to seal a bill of exceptions, but not to
settle it in a particular way. The writ when issued will be in the alter-
native form, quod si ita est, and if it be returned quod non ita est, it is
sufficient: Benedict v. Howell, 10 Vroom.
Where the thing in issue, on an application for a mandamus: relates
to a matter with respect to which an inferior court or special tribunal
is, by law, invested with a discretionary power to decide questions of
law or to ascertain matters of fact, the court will not, by mandamus,
usurp the power to dictate how the discretion shall be exercised, or to
decide what conclusions of law or of fact shall be reached: Id.
Justice of Peace-Entry1 of Judgment erroneousip-Remed2y.-While
a justice who has improperly refused to enter a judgment may be com-
pelled by mandamus in a proper case to do so, yet, where he has once
rendered and entered up a judgment, however erroneous, such judgment
cannot be reviewed or disturbed by mandamus, the remedy by appeal or
certiorpiri being ample and adequate ; a justice of the peace, after he has
once rendered judgment in a cause, has no further power or control over
it, to vacate or set it aside, or to render a new judgment, and what is
beyond his authority of his own motion to do, he cannot be lawfully
required by the mandate of another court to perform : O'Brian v. Tall-
,nan, S. C. Mich., Jan. Term 1877.
MARRIED WOMAN. See Trust.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATION.
Sulbsription to Stock of Bridge Company-Afust be authorized biy
Legislature-Bond fide holder -A municipality must have legislative
authority to subscribe to the capital stock of a bridge company before
its officers can bind the body-politic to the payment of bonds purporting
to be issued on that account. Municipal officers cannot rightfully dis-
pense with any of the essential forms of proceeding which the legisla-
ture has prescribed for the purpose of investing them with power to act
in the matter of such a subscription. If they do, the bonds they issue
will be invalid in the hands of all that cannot claim protection as bona
fide holders: McClure v. Township of Oxford, S. C. U. S., Oct. Term
1876.
A statute under which bonds were issued and which was referred to
in the bonds, though passed and approved March 1st 1872, was not by
its terms to go into effect until after its publication in the Kansas
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W.klg (i,,mmm,'alth. This publication did not take place until March
2Ist. Te statute further provided that no bonds could lie issued under
its authority until the question of their issue had been submitted to the
legal voters of the town at an election of which thirty days' notice had
been given. The bonds i.ssued under this act bore date April 15th
1872. IHel. that the bonds carried upon their face unmistakable evi-
dence that the forms of the law under which they purported to have
been issued had not been complied with, and that every dealer in such
bonds is bound to take notice of the statute and of all its requirements:
Id.
NEGLIOENCE. See Bills anel Notes ; Negotiable Instrument.
Contribitory-E'idence for Jin.-In actions for personal injuries
caused by railroad trains, where there are doubtful and qualifying cir-
cumstaics, the question of negligence or want of proper care must be
left to the jury : Bounelv. Delaware, L. & W. Rohilroad Co., 10 Vroom.
The plaintiff will not be ionsuited, unless, upon his own showing, lie
is guilty of negligence which contributed to the injury ; nor will the
verdict be set aside, unless the jury are clearly wrong in their conclu-
sion : hIL
Where a person, as he approaches a railroad crossing, with a single
track and infrequent trains, sees a train with the rear towards hini, going
apparently in an opposite direction, and is deceived by appearances, and
his attentiin distracted by the actions of persons at a distance attempt-
ing to warn him of his danger from the train, which is backing rapidly
and quietly towards him, and a wagon has crossed just befbre him, it will
be left to the jury to say whether there is want of proper care : Md.
Contributory- Walking on Railroad track- Want of care.-Where a
man voluntarily places himself in a position of great danger, and makes a
highway of a railway track, where he has no right to be, and upon which
dangerous vehicles are constantly liable to pass, he is bound to exercise
more than ordinary care and caution to protect himself against danger,
which is thus constantly imminent, and where he fails in this, and does not
even avail himself of the precaution of looking about him, it is impossible,
in speaking of his conduct to characterize it by anything short of reck-
lessness; in such a case his negligence contributes to the injury, and
the court should instruct the jury that the plaintiff is not entitled to
recover: Michiyaa Central Railroad Co. v. Campan, S. C. Mich. Jan.
Term 1877.
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENT.
Scrip-Sares in Banking Lomnany-Estoppcl.-Scrip certificates,
by which it was certified that, after the payment of certain instalments,
the bearer thereof would be entitled to be registered as the holder of
shares in a banking company, were issued to the plaintiff, and by him
deposited with a stockbroker for the purpose of paying the-instalnents
remaining due, and dealing with such certificates as the plaintiff should
direct. The broker, in fraud of the plaintiff, and without his authority,
deposited the scrip with the defendants as security for an amount due
from him, the broker, to the defendants. The defendants were not
aware of the fraud. It was proved that the usage among bankers. dis-
counters, money dealers, and on the stock exchange, had been for many
years to treat such scrip certificates as negotiable instruments trans-
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ferable by mere delivery : J.Ted, on the authority of Goodwin v. .Robarts,
1 App. Cas. 476, Law Rep., 10 Ex. 337, that the defendants were
entitled to the scrip certificates as against the plaintiff, first, on the ground
that by reason of the usage the certificates had become negotiable instru-
meats transferable by mere delivery, and, secondly, on the ground that
the plaintiff, by depositing -with his broker instruments purporting to be
transferable by delivery to a bona fide holder for value, was estopped
from denying they were so transferable : Rumball v. The .Metropolitan
Bank, Law Rep. 2 Q. B. Div.
PARTNERSHIP.
Insolvent-Assignment for Creditors against the consent of a Partner.-
One of the members of an insolvent firm cannot, either before or after
dissolution of the partnership, make a valid assignment of all its effects
for the benefit of creditors, against the will of a copartner, or without
his assent, when he is present or accessible: lolland v. Drake and
others, 29 Ohio St.
Where an assignment is so made against the will of the non-executing
partner, or when he is present and not assenting, and he subsequently
ratifies the assignment, the ratification will relate back to the time of
executing the assignment, and give it effect from that date; but not so
as to defeat the rights of third persons acquired in good faith in the
meantime: Id.
Where, in such a case, an attachment had been levied upon the pro-
perty between the date of the assignment and its ratification, and by
agreement between the attaching creditor, the assignee and the partners,
the property was delivered by the sheriff to the assignee, to be by him
sold in place of the sheriff, and the proceeds to stand in place of the
property, and be applied to the attaching creditor's judgment when
obtained, if the court should hold the attachment good; in an action
by the attaching creditor against the assignee and the partners, to have
the proceeds of the property so applied: Held, that the defendants were
ctopped from setting up as a defence that the lien of the attachment
was lost by delivery of the property to the assignee under said agree-
ment : I .
In such action it was not necessary to make the partnership-creditors
parties defendant: d.
PATENT.
Infringement of-easure of Damages.-In the ascertainment of
profits miade by an infringer of a patented invention the rule is that the
profits are not all he made in the business in which lie used the inven-
tion, but they are the worth of the advantage he obtained by such use,
or, in other words, they are the fruits of that advantage: .Meys v. Cono-
ver, S. 0. U. S. Oct. Term 1876.
Surrender-Effect upon Sitits.-A surrender of a patent means an act
which, in the judgment of law, extinguishes the patent. It is a legal
cancellation of it, and hence can no more be the foundation of the asser-
tion of a right, after the surrender, than could an Act of Congress which
has been repealed: .Aeyer et al. v. Pritchard, S. C. U. S., Oct. Term
1876.
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The re-issue of the patent has no connection with or bearing upon
antecedent suits; it has as to subsequent suits. The antecedent suits
depend upon the patent existing at the time they were commenced, and
unless it exists and is in force at the time of trial and judgment the suits
fail: Id.
POWER. See Trust.
RAILROAD. See Constitutional Law ; Negligence.
Sliowwg Tickets.-A railway company has the right to require pas-
sengers to show tickets or pay fare, and a rule directing its conductors
to remove from the cars those who refuse to comply with the requirement
is reasonable : Slelton, v. Lake Shore, &c., lRaihcay Co., 29 Ohio St.
The fact that a ticket has been purchased by a passenger, which was
afterwards wrongfully taken up by a conductor of one of the defend-
ant's trains, will not relieve the passenger from- the duty of providing
himself with a ticket, or paying fare on another train of the defendaut
in which he may be a passenger : Id.
In such case, the right of action of the passenger would be for the
wrongful taking up of the ticket, and not for having been removed from
a train by another conductor for refusing to pay fare : Id.
Storm-Liabilit, for jyuries occasioned by.-A railroad company is
not liable for injuries occasioned by its buildings or structures being
blown down by stormis, where it has used that care and skill in their
structure and maintenance 'which men of ordinary prudence and skill
usually employ; and it is error in such cases to charge the jury that
the company is "bound to guard against all storms which can reasona-
bly be anticipated :" Pittsburgh, Ft. 11'. & G. Railwiay Co. v. Brigham,
29 Ohio St.
SALE. See Landlord and Tenant.
ScRIp. See Neyotiable Izstrument.
SET-OFF.
Lien for Labor-Former Adjudication.-A bailce, converting goods
on which he has bestowed labor and acquired a lien, may, in an action
of trover brought by the owner, set up his lien-claim in reduction of
damages : Longstreet v. Phile, 10 Vroom.
In a suit brought by the lienor for his work and labor, against the
owner, the fact that the owner had recovered judgment for the conver-
sion, raises no presumption that the lienor's claim was adjudicated and
allowed in estimating damages. It must be further shown, that the
claim was, by assent of him entitled to make it, presented for litigation,
and considered in the cause: Id.
SHIPPING.
Charter-arry-Rejection- Tivic-Detentwn.-The plaintiff agreed to
charter a ship for twelve months after the completion of her then pres-
ent voyage. After the completion of the voyage and when the plaintiff
was ready to load the ship, she was detained as unseaworthy; and the
repairs were not finished until more than two months after the comple-
tion of the voyage. Ied. affirming the decision of the Queen's Bench
Division, that the plaintiff was entitled to throw- up the charter-party:
Tally v. Howling, Law Rep. 2 Q. B. Div.
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SURETY. See Guaranty.
Good firfth towards-Concealment of knowledge from.-A person
taking a bond for the future good conduct of an agent already in Iis
employment, must communicate to a surety his knowledge of the past
criminal misconduct of such agent in the course of such past. employ-
ment, in order to make such bond binding: Sooy, et al. v. The State,
10 Vroom.
The mere non-communication of such knowledge, irrespective of motive
or desigh, is a fraud in law, which will invalidate the obligation : Pi.
TEInuRAPH. See Frauds, Statute of.
TRESPASS.
Assault and Battery-elf-defene-Protection of Propert3j.-Birtch
sued Ayres in trespass for an assault and battery. The act complained
of took place at a blacksmith-shop leased by Birteh of Ayrcs, and occu-
pied by Birtch at the time. The case made by Birtch was, that Ayrcs
came into the shop, and being requested by him to leave refused to do
so, whereupon, making use of no more force than was necessary, he pro-
ceeded to put him out, when Ayres struck him a severe blow with a
whiffletree. Ayres, on the contrary, claimed that he went to the shop
to prevent the carrying off by other parties, of some iron which he had
sold to Birtch, but the title to which he was to retain until it was paid
for, which had not then been done ; that Birtch assaulted him immedi-
ately on his entering the shop, and that the blow he struck was in re-
sistance to this assault. H1ebl, that if the facts were as Ayers claimed,
they would constitute a complete defence, unless the force employed by
him in resisting the assault was greater than was necessary to his own
protection ; 2. That the arrangement between Ayres and Birtch was
material as bearing on the question of damages: Ayres v. Birtch, S. 0.
Mich., Jan. Term 1877.
TRUST.
For M.arried Woman-When sustaincd-Powers.-Where a trust is
created for the benefit of a married woman for the purpose of giving her
the separate use and control of lands free from the control of her husband,
it will be sustained; since, to merge the trust in the legal estate, or, to
speak more properly, to convert it into a legal estate, would have the
effect of placing the property in the husband's control by virtue of his
marital rights, and would thus defeat the very purpose of the trust;
Bowen v. Chase et al., S. C. U. S., Oct. Term 1876.
A power to sell or exchange, when exercised, overrides all other dis-
tinct powers; for it is necessarily exclusive of all others; whereas
the uses appointed under other powers may possibly be served out of
the estate procured by the price of the sale or by the exchange : 17.
But when a mere power to convey (as distinguished from a power to
sell) is once executed in favor of a voluntary beneficiary, it cannot be
revoked without reserving a power of revocation, and will not, therefore,
be siperseded by a subsequent conveyance equally voluntary made under
the same power: Id.
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ITSAGE. See Xeyotiable Instrument ; T'endor
VENDOR AND PURCHASER.
Purchaser without Xotice-zAgent with Limited Power-Estoppel-
Muniments of Title-Trade Uage. -The plaintiff, a tobacco manufac-
turer at Bolton, bought of I., a commission-merchant and agent, and
also a dealer in tobacco, fifty hogsheads of tobacco then lying in bond
in the name of H., in the L. dock. The price was paid. but the tobacco
was to remain in the dock, to be forwarded to the plaintiff as lie might
want it for the purpose of his business, with an understanding that the
tobacco was to be cleared by H. and dispatched to Bolton free of any
charge for commission, or, should the plaintiff sell any portion of it, to
be delivered to his vendees; the plaintiff remitting to I. the amount of
duty and dock charges. This arrangement was one so usual in the
tobacco trade, that any other arrangement was exceptional. For this
purpose the tobacco was allowed to remain in the name of H. in the
dock books, and he retained the dock warrants. In his own books,
however, the transaction was entered as a sale to the plaintiff. H., rep-
resenting the tobacco to be his own property, pledged it with the defend-
ants as security for a loan, banding them the dock-warrants; and he
caused the tobacco to be transferred into their names in the dock books,
the defendants having no knowledge that the plaintiff was interested in
it. II. shortly afterwards absconded, and was adjudicated bankrupt.
The plaintiff demanded the tobacco of the defendants, but they claimed
to retain it, either on the gound that the plaintiff had armed H. with
an ostensible authority to deal with the goods as his own, or that he was
intrusted with the tobacco or the documents of title with authority to
pledge or sell within the Factors' Acts : tield, by DENIMAN. J., on mo-
tion forjudgment, the judge having power to draw inferences of fact,
that 11. was not intrusted with the tobacco as factor or agent for sale,
but only to clear and forward it to the plaintiff or to his vendees as and
when required, and consequently that he had no authority to sell or to
pledge it. Held. also, that, looking at the usage of the trade, the plain-
tiff had not given any ostensible authority to H. to pledge the tobacco:
Johnson v. The aredit Lyonais, L. R. 2 C. P. Div.
WATERS AND WATERCOURSE.
License to fill up-Statute of Frauds-Estoppel- Ultra Vi'res.-An
agreement between the owner of an artificial watercourse and a railroad
company, whereby the former consents that the latter, in the construction
of its road, may fill the channel and divert the water into a new channel
on its own land, in consideration that the railroad company will open the
old channel and restore the water thereto whenever requested, is not a
contract for an interest in land within the meaning of the Statute of
Frauds: 11anzilton and Rosscille flydraulic Co. v. Cincinnati 11. and D.
Railroad Co., 29 Ohio St.
Where a license to fill up such watercourse is obtained from a corpo-
ration in possession as owner, in consideration of a promise to reopen and
restore the watercourse when requested so to do, the licensee, when sued
for a breach of his promise, is estopped from setting up that the owner-
.-hip and maintenance of the watercourse by the corporation are ultra
'ires : Id.
